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Abstract
In evaluating detection methods, the malware research com-
munity relies on scan results obtained from online platforms
such as VirusTotal. Nevertheless, given the lack of stan-
dards on how to interpret the obtained data to label apps,
researchers hinge on their intuitions and adopt different label-
ing schemes. The dynamicity of VirusTotal’s results along
with adoption of different labeling schemes significantly af-
fect the accuracies achieved by any given detection method
even on the same dataset, which gives subjective views on
the method’s performance and hinders the comparison of
different malware detection techniques.
In this paper, we demonstrate the effect of varying (1) time,
(2) labeling schemes, and (3) attack scenarios on the perfor-
mance of an ensemble of Android repackaged malware de-
tection methods, called dejavu, using over 30,000 real-world
Android apps. Our results vividly show the impact of varying
the aforementioned 3 dimensions on dejavu’s performance.
With such results, we encourage the adoption of a standard
methodology that takes into account those 3 dimensions in
evaluating newly-devised methods to detect Android (repack-
aged) malware.
1 Introduction
The research community has been working towards devising
methods to detect Android malware (e.g., [16,19,26,31]). De-
spite proving to be sometimes inconsistent [12], researchers
rely on VirusTotal [32] to either download training data
to evaluate their newly-devised methods [30, 33, 38], or to
label the apps they manually gathered from the wild (e.g., app
marketplaces) [4,15,36], due to the lack of better alternatives.
To be objective, VirusTotal does not provide users with
binary labels per app, such as malicious or benign. It instead
provides its users with the scan results of around 60 antivi-
ral software. Unfortunately, such results have been found to
change over time (e.g., from benign to malicious and vice
versa) [18]. Furthermore, there are no standards on how to
utilize the obtained scan results to label apps. In this context,
researchers use their intuition and adopt ad-hoc methods to
label the apps in the datasets they train their methods with or,
more importantly, release to the research community as bench-
marks. For example, based on VirusTotal’s scan results, Li
et al. labeled the apps in their Piggybacking dataset as mali-
cious if at least one scanner deemed an app as malicious [15],
Wei et al. labeled apps in the AMD dataset as malicious if
50% or more of the total scanners labeled an app as such [36],
and the authors of the Drebin dataset [4] labeled an app as
malicious if at least two out of ten scanners they manually
selected courtesy of their reputation (e.g., AVG, BitDefender,
Kaspersky, McAfee, etc.), deemed an app as malicious.
Researchers have also found that training and testing a
malware detection method using different datasets (i.e., con-
structed for different experimental attack scenarios), yields
different detection results [22]. In fact, varying the freshness
of scan results and the labeling scheme alters the distribution
of malicious and benign apps in the same dataset, effectively
yielding different datasets and, in turn, different detection
results. Therefore, our hypothesis is that depending on the
3-dimensions of (1) time, (2) labeling scheme, and (3) at-
tack scenario implied by the utilized test dataset, the same
malware detection method might perform differently. This,
we argue, might hinder the comparability of different detec-
tion approaches. Furthermore, it might incite researchers to
dismiss promising detection approaches, because they under-
perform on a dataset with outdated labels, or because they
utilize a different labeling scheme than the one adopted by
the dataset’s authors.
To objectively evaluate the performance of newly-devised
detection methods, in this paper, we motivate the adoption
of a framework that considers the dimensions of time, label-
ing scheme, and dataset to evaluate Android (repackaged)
malware detection methods. To further motivate the need for
such framework, we demonstrate the impact of varying the
aforementioned three dimensions on the performance of the
same detection method. In our demonstration, we focus on
Android repackaged malware as a use case primarily due to
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the threat it poses to the Android ecosystem, namely, under-
mining user trust in legitimate apps, their developers, and the
app distribution process. Using three malware datasets, viz.
Malgenome [41], Piggybacking [15], and AMD [36] along
with 1882 apps downloaded from the Google Play market-
place, we train and test a framework, dejavu1, which utilizes
an ensemble of detection methods that have each individually
been successfully utilized by researchers to effectively detect
Android repackaged [40,41] or piggybacked [15,16] malware.
Such methods include compiler fingerprinting, probabilistic
classification using a naive Bayes classifier, and matching
apps according to their metadata, components, classes, and
methods.
Our results show that the scan results obtained from
VirusTotal are continuously changing with time and, hence,
should not be taken for granted unless they are up-to-date.
Secondly, we found that such VirusTotal results–regardless
of their freshness–can significantly alter the composition of a
dataset (i.e., which apps are malicious, and which are benign),
depending on the scheme adopted to label apps in a dataset.
This phenomenon affected the detection accuracy of our en-
semble method, dejavu, by 37.5% (i.e., 0.72 versus 0.99),
which gives different views of the method’s effectiveness.
The contributions of this paper are:
• A malware detection evaluation methodology, which
mandates varying the freshness of scan results (e.g., from
VirusTotal), the scheme adopted to label apps, and the
attack scenario (section 4), and a demonstration of the
effect of varying the aforementioned dimensions on the
detection accuracies of an ensemble of malware detec-
tion methods called dejavu (described in section 3).
• An analysis of the samples that are labeled differently
when using different labeling schemes, which concludes
that the majority of such apps are Adware and the major-
ity of the URL’s they contact are benign (section 5).
• We make the results of our experiments and dejavu’s
source code available online 2.
In section 2, we motivate the need for our research using exam-
ples that we encountered during the implementation dejavu,
and briefly discuss the attack scenarios usually encountered
by Android repackaged malware detection methods. Section
6 discusses threats to validity. Related work is presented in
section 7 and the paper is concluded in section 8.
2 Background
In this section, we motivate the need for our paper and its line
of research with examples. The first example in section 2.1
1Déjà vu (/’deZA ’vy/) is the feeling that one has experienced an event
before. In essence, our framework attempts to match an app under test against
a repository of previously-analyzed (i.e., seen before), apps to decide whether
an app is repackaged (and potentially malicious).
2https://goo.gl/p7hkH9
demonstrates the importance of considering the dimensions
of time and labeling scheme. In section 2.2, we give exam-
ples of attack scenarios under which a detection method can
encounter Android repackaged malware.
2.1 Motivating Example
During our evaluation of dejavu’s components, particularly
the quick matching module, against the Piggybacking dataset
we came across multiple dubious scenarios. In summary, the
quick matching module utilizes compiler fingerprinting to
classify apps as malicious or benign if their codebases do
not match. One of the scenarios we encountered was during
testing an app called TP.LoanCalculator. Despite being
labeled by the authors of the Piggybacking dataset as mali-
cious, the quick matching module deemed the test app3 as
benign. After inspection, we found that the module classified
the aforementioned test app as benign because it matched
one4 of the apps dejavu keeps as a reference dataset (section
3) in terms of metadata, used compiler, and even codebase.
Given that Piggybacking comprises benign apps and their
repackaged malicious versions, it is expected to find apps
that match in terms of metadata, graphical user interface, and
file names. However, two apps possessing the exact same
codebase implies that they are basically the same app, perhaps
with slight modifications to their resource files (e.g., strings
and colors). So, how can two apps in the same dataset and with
identical codebases be simultaneously deemed as malicious
and benign? One possible answer to this question is that the
malicious app altered the resource files of the original one
(e.g., to change a URL), which we found not to be the case.
The more plausible answer is that either, or both, apps were
given incorrect labels.
In [15], the authors of the Piggybacking dataset labeled
the apps they gathered with the aid of VirusTotal scan re-
sults. So, we retrieved the VirusTotal results of both apps
by querying the platform’s web interface. The test app was
labeled malicious by 14 out of 60 antiviral software scan-
ners. We noticed, however, that the results acquired from
VirusTotal indicated that the app was last analyzed in 2013.
So, we uploaded the app’s APK archive for re-analysis in
late 2018 to see whether the number of scanners would differ.
The 2018 version of the scan results indicated that three more
scanners deemed the app malicious.
The scan results obtained for the reference app were more
interesting. Similar to its malicious version, this presumably
benign app was last analyzed in 2013. In this case, the scan
results from VirusTotal indicated that all scanners deemed
the app as benign, displaying green "Clean" labels next to
the names of all scanners. Nevertheless, after clicking on the
Reanalyze button, 17 of the green labels turned red displaying
different malware family names that indicate the malignancy
32b44135f245a2bd104c4b50dc9df889dbd8bc79b
4d8472cf8dcc98bc124bd5144bb2689785e245d83
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of the app. That is to say, the reference app originally labeled
and released as part of the Piggybacking dataset as a benign
app is, in fact, another version of a malicious app of the type
Adware.
Needless to say, the authors of Piggybacking did not in-
tentionally mislabel apps. The most likely scenario is that, at
the time of releasing the dataset, the reference app was still
deemed as benign by the VirusTotal scanners. Our example
shows the evolution of scan results returned by VirusTotal
and the impact of time on them. This phenomenon implies
that prior to using any datasets–including manually-labeled
ones, all apps need to be re-analyzed and re-labeled.
Having mentioned labeling our example shows that 17 out
of 60 scanners (i.e., 28.33% of scanners), deemed both apps
as malicious. Interestingly, some renowned scanners includ-
ing AVG, McAfee, Kaspersky, Microsoft, and TrendMicro
continue to deem both apps as benign. However, according to
the authors’ criterion to label an app as malicious if at least
one scanner deems it so [15], both apps would be labeled as
malicious. The same would not hold for the authors of the
AMD dataset who consider an app as malicious if at least 50%
of the VirusTotal scanners deem it malicious [36]. Those
two dimensions (i.e., time and labeling scheme/criteria), are
expected to affect the performance of any detection frame-
work using the same dataset, especially if the malicious apps
are repackaged or belong to ambiguous malware types such as
Adware or Riskware. This paper attempts to demonstrate the
effect of varying those two dimensions on the performance of
an ensemble method, dejavu, built to detect Android repack-
aged malware.
2.2 Attack Scenarios
Consider a malware author (hereafter attacker) who wishes
to write a malicious app that (1) resembles a renowned, be-
nign app to trick users into downloading what they believe
is a new version of a popular app, and (2) manages to evade
detection by any app vetting mechanisms employed by the
marketplace(s) the attacker targets. To achieve the first objec-
tive, the attacker can repackage a benign app with malicious
content which is, in fact, a straightforward task [15, 21].
As for the second objective, researchers have identified two
different scenarios that can be adopted by attackers to evade
detection by vetting mechanisms employed by app market-
places [22,33]. In both scenarios, we assume that the attacker
does not have access to information about (a) the methods (or
lack thereof) used by the target marketplace to vet apps, and
(b) the dataset of apps used to train the marketplace’s vetting
mechanism. By training, we do not assert the use of machine
learning classifiers; instead, we refer to apps used by a vetting
mechanism as references of what is malicious and what is be-
nign. The only information we assume the attacker has access
to is the list of apps hosted on a marketplace, which can be
easily obtained (e.g., by crawling a marketplace) [33]. Given
such limited information, the attacker might assume that mar-
ketplaces use the apps they host as references of benign apps,
especially since such apps have undergone a vetting process
upon being uploaded. Based on this assumption, we identify
two scenarios: conventional and confusion, which we describe
in the following paragraphs.
Conventional Scenario On the one hand, the attacker may
opt to upload the repackaged app (α∗) to a marketplace (µ)
that does not host its original, benign version (α). This means
that the vetting mechanism employed by (µ) will be faced
with an out-of-sample app (i.e., one it has never seen before),
and hence cannot easily match to either benign or malicious
apps. Since it has been found that the majority of repackaged
apps dwell on marketplaces on which their original versions
are not hosted [33], we refer to this common scenario as
conventional.
Confusion Scenario On the other hand, the attacker may
adopt the opposite approach by opting to upload their repack-
aged app (α∗) to a marketplace (µ) on which the original app
(α) is hosted. The rationale behind this choice is that vetting
mechanisms can be perplexed by (α∗) which resembles a be-
nign app it has seen before. This scenario is indeed the less
common [33], yet has been found to be more effective against
some techniques, such as machine learning classifiers [22].
For example, an attacker targeting Google Play might
decide upon downloading a popular gaming app (e.g.,
com.rovio.angrybirds), grafting it with a payload that
displays advertisements to the users, slightly altering its
appearance (e.g., via modifying colors or strings), and re-
uploading it to Google Play under a slightly different
name (e.g., com.rovio.crazybirds). If Google Play in-
deed uses com.rovio.angrybirds in training its app vet-
ting mechanism, it is likely that such mechanism deems
com.rovio.crazybirds as benign, especially since the
repackaged app’s components, structure, and even behavior
are expected to match those of its original version.
3 dejavu
We implemented dejavu to utilize three different methods that
have been successfully used to detect Android repackaged
malware. Each detection method is implemented as a separate
module, viz. quick matching, probabilistic classification, and
deep matching. As seen in figure 1, the primary input to de-
javu is an Android test app (α∗) which is sequentially tested
by dejavu’s methods to decide upon its class (i.e., malicious
or benign).
To emulate the attack scenarios we discussed in section
2.2, we implemented dejavu to resemble a marketplace’s
vetting mechanism making use of a repository of Android
apps that depict a reference dataset against which test apps are
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dejavu
Test App (α∗)
Quick Matching
∀αpkg ∈ C[center]
∀center ∈ C
(tmatch, tclassification)
dmatch
nmatch
if similarity(α∗pkg, center) ≥ tmatch
if similarity(α∗pkg, αpkg) ≥ tmatch
if compare(α∗, α) ≥ tmatch
if code(α∗) == code(α)
return benign
Disassemble + analyze APK
+ extract static features (α∗static)
Deep Matching
return label
if confidence ≥ tclassification
label, confidence = clfσlabel .predict(α
∗
static)
clfσlabel = NaiveBayes(AMD+GPlay+Original)
Probabilistic Classification
(§ 3.1)
(§ 3.2)
return benign
else
return malicious
if counter ≥ length(A)/2
counter+ = 1
if label(σlabel, α) == malicious
∀α ∈ A
A =match(α∗, dmatch, nmatch)
(§ 3.3)
else if compiler(α) == dx || dexmerge
return malicious
σlabel
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
&& compiler(α∗) 6= dx || dexmerge
?
Figure 1: An overview of the process adopted by dejavu to
deem Android apps as malicious or benign. The framework
implements three types of detection methods (dashed boxes)
that are executed in sequence (i.e., top-down). The numbers
on the bottom right of every box depict the section number in
which the corresponding detection method is discussed.
compared. To hasten dejavu’s decision about an app’s class,
apps in the reference dataset have been previously decompiled
and analyzed. The data extracted from each app is saved to
a directory which contains a dictionary of information about
the app’s components (e.g., lists of activities, files, libraries,
services, etc.), the app’s icon, and a vector of static features
extracted from its APK archive (listed in appendix A).
The labeling scheme to be adopted during classification is
dictated by the parameter (σlabel) and can have the following
values:
• vt1-vt1 labels an app malicious if one or more
VirusTotal scanners deem it as malicious; otherwise,
it is labeled as benign.
• vt50p-vt50p labels an app malicious if 50% or more of
the VirusTotal scanners report it as malicious; other-
wise, the app is labeled as benign.
• vt50p-vt1 labels an app malicious if 50% or more of the
scanners deem it malicious and labels an app as benign
if none of such scanners deem it malicious.
Not only does the value of (σlabel) affect the ground truth
label of (α∗), it instructs dejavu to use different sets of apps
in the reference dataset, viz. the ones that pass the criteria of
the labeling scheme, to match apps and train classifiers. In
other words, the value of (σlabel) can alter the composition of,
both, the reference dataset and test apps.
3.1 Quick Matching
The quick matching detection method uses three techniques to
classify the test app (α∗) as quickly and as reliably as possible,
prior to delving into more time-consuming detection methods.
Firstly, it checks whether the test app (α∗) matches any benign
app(s) in dejavu’s reference dataset. If a match is found,
the method uses the techniques of codebase comparison and
compiler fingerprinting to decide upon (α∗)’s class.
Repackaging Detection To trick users into voluntarily
downloading their repackaged malicious apps, malware au-
thors might opt to retain some basic information (or metadata)
of the original benign app, such as app package name (e.g.,
com.my.app), app description, icon, and so forth. This be-
havior can be used to match test apps to benign ones in our
reference dataset, which facilitates making decisions about
their nature.
To rapidly figure out whether (α∗) can be matched us-
ing quick matching, we attempt to match its package name
to those of benign apps (i.e., according to σlabel), in de-
javu’s reference dataset. The package names of such be-
nign apps are clustered–using the Levenshtein distance
as a distance metric [27]–and saved as a dictionary (C);
the values in the dictionary are lists of app package
names, whereas the keys are the centers of each clus-
ter. For example, the cluster of apps {jp.colopl.allenCN,
jp.colopl.enkare, jp.colopl.krarmy, . . .} has the cen-
ter jp.colopl.entrain.
Firstly, the package name of (α∗), denoted (α∗pkg), is com-
pared against the centers (center) of different clusters (C)
(lines 1 and 2 in figure 1). The comparison is based on the
Jaccard index [6], which returns a number between 0.0 and
1.0. If the similarity between (α∗pkg) and (center) is greater
than or equal to a matching threshold (tmatch) (i.e., line 2),
the cluster is investigated further. That is to say, every pack-
age name in the cluster (∀αpkg ∈ center) is compared against
the test app’s (α∗pkg) (line 3). In line 4, if the package name
of (α∗) matches that of an app (α) in the reference dataset
with similarity greater than or equal to (tmatch), the metadata
4
(i.e., package names, descriptions, and icons), of both apps
are compared (line 5). If such metadata is similar with thresh-
old greater than the (tmatch) threshold, we assume that (α∗)
is some version of (α). To decide whether (α∗) is malicious
or benign, quick matching uses the techniques of codebase
comparison and compiler fingerprinting.
Codebase Comparison Regardless of being malicious or
benign, if (α∗) shares the exact codebase with (α), then we
assume that both apps are effectively the same in terms of
functionality. It follows that, if (α) is labeled as benign ac-
cording to (σlabel), then (α∗) should be deemed as benign as
well. The question is: what if (α∗) is, in fact, a repackaged
version of (α) grafted with a malicious payload. If that is true,
then the attacker needs to alter (α)’s codebase to add their
malicious code or the code that dynamically loads it, which
contradicts the assumption above. In this context, we imple-
mented quick matching to compare the codebases of (α∗) and
(α) (i.e., line 6), and deem the former app as benign if the
codebases are identical.
In checking the codebase, dejavu’s quick matching detec-
tion method compares the classes.dex files of both apps,
and ignores the resource files. However, we believe that this
does not affect the check’s effectiveness. The only scenario
we could think of that could render the codebase comparison
technique ineffective is if the original app (α) stores Java or
Dex bytecode as a string that is stored in the resource files
(e.g., strings.xml), and dynamically loads it during runtime.
In this case, the attacker can modify this code to include their
malicious code and repackage the app. Despite its technical
possibility, we argue that such scenario is highly unlikely to
manifest, especially since Android developers have more ad-
vanced, reliable, and secure methods to dynamically alter the
functionalities and appearances of their apps (e.g., via App
Bundles [1]).
Compiler Fingerprinting There are some scenarios in
which the codebases of (α∗) and (α) could differ, yet both
apps could be benign. For example, (α∗) may be an updated
version of (α), which indeed should have a different codebase.
However, the test app (α∗) may be a repackaged version of
(α) withholding malicious code that uses the original code-
base as a facade. To differentiate between such scenarios,
quick matching uses the technique of compiler fingerprinting
proposed by Stazzere [29], which detects Android repack-
aged malware based on the following assumption: legitimate
developers usually have access to their apps’ source code
and, hence, their apps should be compiled using the dx or
dexmerge compilers that ship with the Android SDK. Conse-
quently, apps that are compiled using third-party compilers
used by reverse engineering tool (e.g., dexlib), should raise
major suspicions.
Based on this idea, quick matching fingerprints (α∗)’s and
(α)’s compilers using APKiD [9] and compares them (i.e.,
line 8). Given that it has been already established that the
codebases of (α∗) and (α) are different, the scenario in which
(α)’s compiler is dx or dexmerge, whereas (α∗)’s compiler is
a third-party compiler (e.g., dexlib), implies that the devel-
oper of (α∗) most likely did not have access to the original
app’s source code and had to repackage it. If this condition
holds, quick matching deems (α∗) malicious, as seen in line
9.
One might argue that some developers may elect to decom-
pile and repackage their apps to include slight modifications
(e.g., fix a typographical error), without having to recompile
the source code, which should undermine the correctness of
the check in line 8. We argue that such slight modifications
should not affect the app codebase. So, even if (α∗) embodies
a repackaged version of (α), having the same codebase should
help deem it benign according to the check in line 6.
One exception to this general case is if legitimate develop-
ers elect to alter their codebases (e.g., to change a constant
String), on the smali level and repackage their apps. How-
ever, legitimate developers that possess their apps’ code have
no good reasons to work on the smali level to alter their
codebases. Given the rarity of this scenario and the severity
of false negatives, in this case, we opt to deem test apps that
pass the check in line 8 as malicious.
Other Scenarios The checks used between lines 1 and 9
do not cover all possible scenarios. Firstly, there are the sce-
narios in which quick matching was not able to match (α∗)
to any apps in dejavu’s reference dataset. Secondly, there are
scenarios in which the codebases of (α∗) and (α) are not the
same, yet they share the same compilers. For example, if both
(α∗) and (α) are compiled using the dx compiler, that could
either mean that (a) (α∗) is a benign update to the benign
app (α), or (b) (α∗) is a malicious update to a benign app (α)
whose source code is available online (e.g., K-9 Mail [2]). In
those cases, quick matching cannot make confident decisions
about (α∗)’s class and defers the making of this decision to
probabilistic classification.
3.2 Probabilistic Classification
The inability of quick matching to classify (α∗) with absolute
confidence according to domain-knowledge-based assump-
tions implies uncertainty. To deal with such uncertainty, we
widen the scope within which we attempt to match the test app
(α∗). So, instead of matching the test app (α∗) to a specific
app in terms of metadata, we attempt to match it to a class of
apps (i.e., malicious or benign), using information about the
files in its APK archive, its components, the permissions it
requests, and the API calls it utilizes. Furthermore, instead of
yielding absolute confidence about the test app (α∗)’s class,
we relax this requirement and return a probabilistic measure.
Such probabilistic measure, we argue, suits types and fam-
ilies of malware that are ambiguous (e.g., Adware), which
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are considered to be potentially unwanted rather than purely
malicious. Lastly, we still aspire to maintain the efficiency of
the classification process by classifying a test app as quickly
as possible.
To achieve such objectives, the probabilistic classification
detection method relies on a probabilistic machine learning
classifier to infer the class of (α∗) for the following reasons.
In general, machine learning proved to be a reliable method in
the field of (Android) malware detection and has, hence, been
utilized by various researchers within this domain [4, 17, 30].
Furthermore, once features are extracted from Android apps,
machine learning classifiers are usually faster to train and
validate than more complex methods (e.g., dependency graph
isomorphism [7]). However, the abundance of research in this
field and the utilization of different datasets and features make
it difficult to compare their performances to decide upon a
few approaches to consider [20]. Consequently, we chose a
classifier that yields classification confidence in the form of a
probability along with the class label.
The classifier we use is a multinomial Naive Bayes clas-
sifier trained using static features extracted from the apps in
dejavu’s reference dataset. Those static features, enumerated
in appendix A, depict information about the apps’ compo-
nents [23, 24], the permissions they request [4] [37], the API
calls found in their codebases [39], and the compilers used to
compile them.
According to the value of (σlabel), the classifier will be
trained using the apps in the reference dataset which satisfy
the labeling scheme’s criteria (i.e., line 10); hence, the name
(cl fσlabel ). For example, if the labeling scheme is vt50p-vt1,
the classifier will be trained using malicious apps deemed by
more than 50% of VirusTotal scanners and using benign
apps deemed malicious by no VirusTotal scanners.
To classify (α∗), the aforementioned static features are ex-
tracted from the app to yield a vector of numerical features
(α∗static). In line 11, the classifier (cl fσlabel ) uses (α
∗
static) to
classify the test app and returns a (label) corresponding to
the class (i.e., malicious or benign), it is more confident (α∗)
belongs to along with a (con f idence) in such decision in
the format of a probability. If the returned (con f idence) is
greater than or equal to a threshold passed to dejavu, called
(tclassi f ication), the probabilistic classification method returns
the (label) (lines 12-13). Otherwise, the task of classify-
ing (α∗) is further deferred to the deep matching detection
method.
3.3 Deep Matching
The last detection method used by dejavu is deep matching.
Unlike quick matching, the deep matching method attempts
to match the test app (α∗) to a number of similar malicious
or benign apps in the reference dataset. The method defines
the similarity between apps in terms of the overlap between
different app information. For example, given two lists of
strings, say (L1) and (L2), depicting the files included in the
APK archives of two apps, deep matching defines similarity
in terms of the Jaccard index between the lists (i.e., |L1∩L2||L1∪L2| ).
In line 14, deep matching takes the test app (α∗) as an input
along with an analysis depth (dmatch) and an upper bound
on the apps to match to (α∗). The upper bound parameter,
(nmatch), limits the number of apps against which (α∗) is al-
lowed to be matched. This parameter is meant to speed up
the matching process by instructing the match method to
conclude its matching process once it finds (nmatch) apps that
are similar to (α∗) with a threshold of at least 0.67 (i.e., two-
thirds), and returns the matched apps as a set (A).
The exact information used by the deep matching’s match
method (to compare and match apps), depends on the value
of the (dmatch) parameter, which depicts the depth of the ex-
tracted information. If dmatch == 1, deep matching compares
the apps’ metadata in a manner similar to how quick matching
compares (α∗) and (α) in line 5, viz. the apps’ package names,
descriptions, and the structural similarity of their icons ac-
cording to the SSIM measure [35]. If dmatch == 2, the method
retrieves lists of all components declared by the two apps be-
ing compared and calculates the Jaccard index between them.
To avoid prolonging the matching process, deep matching
does not compare the content of components; instead their
names. Lastly, if the value of dmatch == 3, the list of resource
files, libraries, classes, and methods are compared using the
Jaccard distance as well.
The match method is implemented in a cumulative manner
that includes similarity scores from depth levels lower than
the level passed to the method in the final similarity score.
For example, if (dmatch == 3), the method would include the
similarity score achieved at depths one, two, and three in the
final similarity score it returns. The overall similarity score
between two apps is an unweighted average of all the scores
returned by each depth level. For instance, if matching depths
one, two, and three returned scores of 0.8, 0.65, and 0.79 the
final score returned will be 0.74. So, the higher the value of
(dmatch), the more the information retrieved and compared.
For each app (α) matched by match, the label of this app
is retrieved in accordance with the labeling scheme (σlabel)
passed to dejavu. The method keeps track of the number
of apps labeled as malicious (lines 16-17). The final verdict
returned by deep matching vis-à-vis (α∗)’s class is determined
as a simple majority vote of the labels/classes of the matched
apps (i.e., 50%+1). For instance, if (α∗) is matched to a set
of ten apps (A) six of which are malicious, the app (α∗) will
be labeled as malicious (line 19). The test app (α∗) will be
labeled as benign (line 21) if 50% or less of the apps in (A)
are malicious, according to (σlabel).
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4 Evaluation
In this section, we use the detection methods of dejavu to
investigate the effect of varying the dimensions of time, la-
beling schemes adopted by researchers to label apps in their
datasets, and attack scenarios on the detection accuracies of
such methods. To tackle such concerns, we postulate the fol-
lowing research questions and devise experiments that address
them:
RQ1 How do labeling schemes affect the choice of dejavu’s
input parameter values?
RQ2 How does the variation of label values in time, affect the
accuracies of detection methods?
RQ3 How does varying the labeling scheme affects the accu-
racies of detection methods?
RQ4 How do detection methods perform across different sce-
narios (i.e., conventional versus confusion)?
RQ5 What effect does combining detection methods have on
detection performance?
RQ6 What do the apps that do not fit either criteria in the
vt50p-vt1 labeling scheme comprise?
4.1 Datasets
In this section, we briefly discuss the composition of the
datasets we used to train and test dejavu. The largest, and
most recent, dataset we use is AMD [36], which comprises
24,553 malicious apps of different malware families and types.
The dataset provides us with a comprehensive view of mali-
cious behaviors that can be found in Android malware. Con-
sequently, dejavu uses the apps from the AMD dataset as
references to malicious behaviors and includes them in its
reference dataset.
To complement the malicious apps in dejavu’s reference
dataset with the benign ones, we downloaded around 1900
apps from the Google Play store and added them to the refer-
ence dataset. We do not assert that such apps are benign, given
the unfortunate fact that some malicious apps make it past
Google Play’s app vetting mechanisms and dwell on the mar-
ketplace [33]. Instead, all apps in the reference dataset are dy-
namically labeled according to the specified labeling scheme
(σlabel), and based on recently downloaded VirusTotal scan
reports, prior to being used to train any detection methods.
We use two datasets to test dejavu’s detection methods em-
ulating the conventional and confusion scenarios discussed in
section 2.2. The first test dataset we utilize is Malgenome [41].
It originally comprised 1260 malicious apps, almost 86% of
which were found to be repackaged malware instances. De-
spite being released in 2012, malicious apps that were orig-
inally released as part of Malgenome continue to exist in
Android app marketplaces and, consequently, in more recent
Android malware datasets [22, 36]. Using this dataset, we
wish to assess dejavu’s ability to successfully recognize ma-
licious apps that do not match to any benign ones used by the
framework (i.e., conventional scenario).
The second test dataset we use is Piggybacking [15]. The
dataset comprises 1400 pairs of original apps along with their
repackaged versions gathered between 2014 and 2017. Given
the hashes of the apps belonging to this dataset, we down-
loaded as many apps as possible from the Androzoo reposi-
tory [3]. We managed to acquire 1355 original, benign apps
and 1399 of their repackaged, malicious versions. The reason
behind such an imbalance is that some original apps have
more than one repackaged version. In our experiments, we
refer to the benign segment of the dataset as Original, and
the dataset’s malicious segment as Piggybacked (not to be
confused with Piggybacking, which also includes the Origi-
nal segment). We use this dataset to simulate the confusion
scenario in which an attacker targets a marketplace with a
repackaged malware whose benign version is hosted by the
marketplace. So, we include the Original segment in dejavu’s
reference dataset and test the framework’s detection methods
using both, the Original and Piggybacked segments. The
former segment of the dataset is used to ensure that the tech-
niques adopted by dejavu’s detection methods do not prevent
it from correctly classifying benign apps it has seen before.
The latter segment depicts the manifestation of the confusion
scenario.
4.2 Dataset Composition Analysis
As discussed in section 1, adopting different labeling schemes
alters the composition of the same dataset. In table 1, we show
the impact of, both, time and labeling schemes on each of the
datasets enumerated in section 4.1. For each Dataset, the table
shows the number of malicious/benign apps the dataset con-
tained at the time of release (i.e., using the original labeling
scheme). The emboldened values in the Labeling Scheme
(σlabel) column, depicts the same labeling scheme adopted by
the dataset authors to label apps. For example, malicious apps
in the Piggybacked dataset were labeled as such if at least one
VirusTotal scanners deemed them malicious. However, the
numbers under vt1-vt1, vt50p-vt50p, and vt50p-vt1 are accord-
ing to the latest VirusTotal scan results that we acquired
between December 2018 and January 2019 after re-analyzing
all apps.
Comparing the numbers in the original column and the
emboldened ones gives us an indication of how time affects
the composition of each dataset. As seen in the table, apart
from the Malgenome dataset, time has a substantial effect
on the number of apps that continue to be labeled as mali-
cious or benign according to the labeling scheme adopted
by the dataset’s authors at the time of release. For example,
in [15], the Piggybacked segment of the Piggybacking dataset
comprised 1399 apps that had at least one VirusTotal scan-
ner deeming them as malicious. Using the same criterion, as
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Table 1: The impact of time and labeling schemes on the composition of Android datasets.
Labeling Scheme (σlabel )Dataset original vt1-vt1 vt50p-vt50p vt50p-vt1
More Malicious
Scan Results
Less Malicious
Scan Results
Piggybacked (2014-2017) 1399 (malicious) 1263 (90%) 159 (11.36%) 159 (11.36%) 845 (60.4%) 234 (16.72%)
Original (2014-2017) 1355 (benign) 852 (63%) 1348 (99.5%) 852 (63%) 219 (16.16%) 212 (15.64%)
Malgenome (2010-2012) 1234 (malicious) 1234 (100%) 1234 (100%) 1234 (100%) 366 (29.65%) 609 (49.35%)
Gplay (2017) 1882 (benign) 1572 (83%) 1837 (99.46%) 1572 (83%) 107 (5.7%) 79 (4.2%)
AMD (2010-2016) 24553 (malicious) 24552 (99.9%) 12765 (52%) 12765 (52%) 12481 (50.83%) 6454 (26.3%)
of early 2019, about 10% of such apps seize to be labeled
as malicious and switch to becoming benign. The effect of
time on the Original segment of the aforementioned dataset
is more significant; about 38% of the apps originally labeled
as benign (i.e., with no VirusTotal scanners deeming them
malicious), were updated to be malicious. Similarly, 17% of
the apps we downloaded from the Google Play marketplace,
which are presumed to have undergone rigorous vetting prior
to being available for download, were deemed malicious by
at least on VirusTotal scanner. The same effect of time can
be noticed on the AMD dataset where almost 50% of its apps
failed to pass the labeling criterion its authors used to deem
an app malicious (i.e., at least 50% of VirusTotal scanners
deem an app as malicious).
As part of studying the effect of time on the labels of apps
in Android (malware) datasets, we studied the difference in
the number of VirusTotal scanners that deemed apps as ma-
licious/benign between two scans, where we triggered the
latest scan of apps in the aforementioned datasets between
November 2018 and January 2019. Each scan report down-
loaded from VirusTotal includes a field, positives_delta,
that depicts that difference as a signed integer. A positive dif-
ference indicates an increased number of scanners deeming
an app malicious, whereas a negative difference indicates a
decreased number of such scanners. In table 1, we summa-
rize those differences for all datasets. The fields (More Ma-
licious Scan Results) and (Less Malicious Scan Results)
show the number of apps in each dataset that had the number
of VirusTotal scanners deeming them as malicious, respec-
tively, increase and decrease. The time interval between two
scans might differ from one app to another. So, the numbers
under both columns do not depict the change in VirusTotal
scan results over a fixed period of time. However, such re-
sults show that the scan results of VirusTotal are dynamic
and continuously changing, which directly affects the com-
position of each dataset. That is to say, each time an app is
(re)analyzed, depending on the labeling scheme, it might have
a different number of VirusTotal scanners deeming it as
malicious and, thus, may switch class from being malicious to
benign or vice versa. Such volatility can render decent results
achieved by a given detection method less indicative of the
method’s quality, especially since it has been achieved on an
obsolete, perhaps incorrect, labeling.
4.3 Malware Detection Experiments
As discussed in section 3, each dejavu detection method ex-
pects different parameters, which can take different values.
To answer RQ2 and RQ3 objectively, we should keep the
value of each detection method’s parameter constant across
different datasets and labeling schemes. However, we do not
know beforehand the impact of varying the values of each pa-
rameter on the detection accuracies of each detection method,
which is the concern of RQ1.
4.3.1 Varying Parameters vs. Detection Accuracies
We ran each of the 3 detection methods against 3 test
datasets, using 4 different labeling schemes, and varying
3 to 4 values of the main parameters of each detection
method (i.e., tmatch ∈ {0.7,0.8,0.9,1.0} for quick matching,
tclassi f ication ∈ {0.7,0.8,0.9,1.0} for probabilistic classifica-
tion, and dmatch ∈ {1,2,3} for deep matching). That yields a
total of 3×4× (2×4+3) = 132 experiments.
The results of such experiments suggest that the detection
methods quick matching, probabilistic classification, and deep
matching yield the best detection accuracies–regardless of the
utilized dataset and labeling scheme–when the values of their
respective parameters are (tmatch = 1.0), (tclassi f ication = 1.0),
and (dmatch = 2). In summary, we noticed that the higher the
value of a parameter, the more precise the detection method
is. For example, increasing quick matching’s (tmatch) value
helps the method increase its detection accuracy against the
Original dataset regardless of the adopted labeling scheme.
We argue that such increase in the parameter’s value instructs
the method to harshen its criteria in matching test apps (α∗) to
apps in dejavu’s reference dataset (α), effectively ruling out
noisy apps and matching apps that are (almost) identical (i.e.,
with (tmatch≥ 0.9). Similarly, higher values of (dmatch) instruct
deep matching to not only match apps according to their
metadata but to include the names of their files, components,
classes, and methods as well, which intuitively yields more
precise matchings and, in turn, classifications. We plot such
classification accuracies and summarize them in figure 2 and
table 5, respectively, in appendix B.
Throughout this section, we plot and tabulate the detection
accuracies achieved by each detection method using the afore-
mentioned parameter values. Furthermore, we ran dejavu’s
ensemble against the test datasets of Piggybacked, Original,
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Table 2: A summary of the detection accuracies achieved by dejavu’s detection methods individually and as an ensemble under
different labeling schemes. The labeling schemes original, vt1-vt1, vt50p-vt50p, and vt50p-vt1 are shortened to org, vt11, vt50,
and vt501, respectively. The detection accuracies in table are the best accuracies achieved by each detection method using values
of (tmatch = 1.0), (tclassi f ication = 1.0), and (dmatch = 2). Lastly, under each labeling scheme, the number of apps in each dataset
(out of Total Apps), may differ, as seen in table 1. The percentage under each detection accuracy depicts the percentage of apps
each method managed to classify out of remaining apps in the dataset after applying the labeling scheme.
Detection Methods Quick Matching Probabilistic Classification Deep Matching dejavu Ensemble
Labeling Scheme (σlabel) org vt11 vt50 vt501 org vt11 vt50 vt501 org vt11 vt50 vt501 org vt11 vt50 vt501
Total Apps
0.89 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.70 0.78 0.51 0.58 0.98 0.96 1.0 1.0 0.83 0.92 0.98 0.99Piggybacked
(confusion/malicious) 71% 49% 99% 87% 97% 80% 55% 83% 4% 4% 5% 0.7% 97% 91% 96% 97% 1399
0.99 0.95 0.85 0.87 0.37 0.45 0.56 0.27 0.64 0.91 1.0 0.91 0.97 0.90 0.69 0.93Original
(reference/benign) 95% 67% 21% 19% 46% 65% 47% 72% 6% 7% 7% 5% 98% 89% 60% 98% 1355
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.74 0.93 0.99 0.99 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.74 0.93 0.99 0.99Malgenome
(conventional/malicious) 2% 2% 2% 2% 99% 67% 78% 93% 2% 1% 1% 1% 99% 68% 79% 93% 1234
Table 3: The detection accuracies scored by each dejavu detection method along with the dejavu Ensemble under different
labeling schemes. The numbers and percentages under the accuracies depict the number of apps all methods managed to classify.
Under the vt50p-vt1 scheme (abbreviated vt501), the number of apps remaining in the dataset differs. So, the same number of
apps classified under such a labeling scheme might yield a different percentage than the other schemes.
Detection Methods Quick Matching Probabilistic Classification Deep Matching dejavu Ensemble
Labeling Scheme (σlabel) org vt11 vt50 vt501 org vt11 vt50 vt501 org vt11 vt50 vt501 org vt11 vt50 vt501
Total Apps
0.68 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.78 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.72 0.99 0.97 0.99Piggybacked
(confusion/malicious) 112 (8%) 112 (38%) 108 (8%) 108 (36%) 0% 267 (19%) 267 (90%) 1399
0.99 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.53 0.53 0.61 0.52 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.99 0.94 0.75 0.94Original
(reference/benign) 149 (11%) 149 (17%) 188 (14%) 188 (22%) 1 (0.07%) 1 (0.1%) 468 (34%) 468 (54%) 1355
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.91 0.91 0.99 0.99 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.90 0.93 0.99 0.99Malgenome
(conventional/malicious) 13 (1%) 513 (41%) 0% 685 (55%) 1234
and Malgenome using such values.
4.3.2 Time vs. Detection Accuracies
The data in table 2 summarizes the detection accuracies
achieved by dejavu and its methods on different datasets
under different labeling schemes. We use the data in this table
to demonstrate the disarray varying the labeling scheme intro-
duces to the composition of training datasets which ultimately
affects the percentage of apps each detection method managed
to analyze and the detection accuracies they yield. Without
considering such percentages, it might seem that quick match-
ing performs better under the vt1-vt1 labeling scheme than on
the original one (i.e., 0.98 versus 0.89, respectively). How-
ever, under original, quick matching manages to classify 71%
of 1399 apps as opposed to 49% under vt1-vt1.
To objectively compare the performance of detection meth-
ods, towards answering RQ2 and RQ3, we considered the
apps that each detection method managed to classify under all
labeling schemes (i.e., an intersection), which we summarize
in table 3. A further demonstration of the impact of labeling
schemes on the composition of training datasets and test re-
sults can be seen in the table. That is the number of apps all
detection methods managed to classify depicts small percent-
ages of the actual dataset. For example, only 112 apps (8%)
out of 1399 were classified by quick matching under different
labeling schemes. This phenomenon reaches an extreme for
the deep matching detection method which manages to clas-
sify completely different apps under each labeling scheme,
yielding an intersection of zero apps.
Similar to table 1, we emboldened the labeling scheme that
was adopted by the datasets’ authors at the time of labeling
and releasing the datasets to highlight the effect of time on the
detection methods’ accuracies. In this case, the Piggybacked,
Original, and Malgenome datasets share the same scheme,
viz. vt1-vt1, or vt11 for short. We argue that time allows the
VirusTotal scan results to mature or converge to a state that
reflects each app’s real intentions. That is to say, the older an
app is, the longer the time analysts have to analyze it, and the
more accurate its labels are expected to be, which should help
different detection methods classify apps in a dataset more
accurately.
The detection accuracy scored by quick matching on the
Piggybacked dataset under vt1-vt1 supports this hypothesis;
the method’s detection accuracy had an improvement of 0.32
(i.e., increase of 47%), under the vt1-vt1 labeling scheme, al-
beit on 8% of the dataset. As for Malgenome, the performance
of quick matching remained the same. So, it seems the time
positively affects the performance of quick matching on mali-
cious datasets. However, the exact opposite experience was
encountered by the detection method on the Original dataset.
Under vt1-vt1, as seen in table 1, the composition of the Orig-
inal dataset significantly differed, with only 63% of the apps
continued to be labeled as benign. To understand whether
this structural modification affected the performance of quick
matching, we retrieved the Original apps misclassified by
the method under vt1-vt1. We found that 100% of such apps
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were compiled using dexlib and were identically matched
to apps compiled using dx or dexmerge, yet the codebases of
both apps differed. So, they were deemed malicious according
to dejavu’s policy seen in line 8 of figure 1. This scenario
would manifest in case (a) the same legitimate developer of
an app opts to update their codebase on the smali level and
repackage their apps, or (b) more likely the VirusTotal scan
results continue to label such apps as benign mistakenly. Un-
der the original labeling scheme, such apps would have been
correctly classified as benign.
The same performance exhibited by quick matching was
exhibited by dejavu’s ensemble. That is to say, on malicious
datasets, time seems to enable dejavu to score better accura-
cies, whereas the detection accuracies on the Original dataset
seems to worsen with time. We investigated the contribution
of each individual detection method to detection accuracies
scored by dejavu as an ensemble (i.e., as seen in appendix
B), and found that quick matching contributed the most to
the correctly classified apps on the Piggybacked and Original
datasets. This explains, we argue, why the performance of
quick matching was replicated on the ensemble method.
4.3.3 Labeling Scheme vs. Detection Accuracies
Towards answering RQ3, we investigated the impact of vary-
ing the labeling scheme on the detection accuracy of dejavu’s
detection methods. Similar to the time dimension, we could
not identify a unified pattern that explains the accuracies
scored by all detection methods. In other words, one cannot
assert, for example, that the performance of all detection meth-
ods improves after adopting the vt50p-vt1 labeling scheme.
The only patterns we could identify were particular to a de-
tection method, on a specific dataset, using certain labeling
schemes. For instance, the accuracies of quick matching and
dejavu’s ensemble generally improve on the Piggybacked
and Malgenome datasets the harsher the condition to deem an
app as malicious gets. Apart from such individual patterns,
the detection accuracies scored by different detection methods
appear to be haphazard.
We argue that varying the labeling scheme alters the labels
in dejavu’s reference dataset, effectively yielding different
versions of such datasets used to train the probabilistic clas-
sifier or match apps. For example, under the vt1-vt1 labeling
scheme, the naive Bayes classifier used to classify apps in
the Original dataset is trained using 24552 malicious apps
from the AMD dataset, whereas the one under the vt50p-vt50p
scheme will be trained using 12765 malicious apps. Intu-
itively, those apps are expected to yield different accuracies.
The mercurial performance of different detection methods
under different labeling schemes on the same datasets is what
we aspire to emboss in this paper. For example, consider
the detection accuracies scored by dejavu’s ensemble on the
Piggybacked dataset. Under the original labeling scheme,
the method scores an accuracy of 0.72. However, the same
method scores an accuracy of 0.99 on the exact same set of
apps under the vt1-vt1 and vt50p-vt1.
So, depending on the adopted labeling scheme, the detec-
tion accuracy of the same detection method on the same
dataset can differ by 37.5% (i.e., from 0.72 to 0.99). This
phenomenon, we believe, is of the utmost significance, es-
pecially since it implies that two independent groups of re-
searchers might have–depending on the labeling perspectives
they adopt–two completely different experiences with work-
ing on the same dataset using two similar or even identical
methods. Not only does this encourages one of such hypo-
thetical groups to mistakenly, yet justifiably, abandon their
approach, it gives other researchers assessing the other group’s
work an incomplete picture of their detection method’s capa-
bilities.
4.3.4 dejavu as an Ensemble
With RQ4, we wish to investigate whether combining dif-
ferent detection methods as a sequential ensemble (i.e., as
seen in figure 1), helps boost the detection accuracies. As dis-
cussed in the previous sections, dejavu’s ensemble detection
method faced the same challenges encountered by the individ-
ual methods courtesy of varying the dimensions of time and
labeling schemes. However, the ensemble method managed
to outperform its individual counterparts in the number of
apps classified. For all datasets, dejavu’s ensemble managed
to classify more apps than individual detection methods.
The reason behind this is that individual detection methods
were designed to defer the classification of an app if they
could not classify it with a confidence higher than a given
value. Combining different methods increases the chances of
classifying an app by one of the three methods.
5 Discussion
In interpreting the results of our experiments, we could not
find any patterns that link the detection accuracies scored by
dejavu’s detection methods on different labeling schemes
and datasets with one another. The lack of such patterns is
exactly what we wish to demonstrate in this paper and its core
contribution, viz. varying the freshness of labels (i.e., time),
the labeling scheme, and the attack scenario (i.e., represented
by the dataset used to test the method), makes the same de-
tection method yield very different detection accuracies. So,
to objectively assess the performance of a detection method,
researchers should take into account those three dimensions,
and evaluate their detection methods using the combinations
of all values of such dimensions rather than focusing on the
combination(s) that yield the best accuracies. As a demonstra-
tion, we applied this evaluation methodology on dejavu and
its detection methods and used the results of this evaluation
to answer the research questions we postulated in section 4.
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During our experiments, we noticed that, generally, vary-
ing the labeling scheme (σlabel) indeed affects the detection
accuracies scored by dejavu’s detection methods. However,
regardless of the adopted labeling scheme, we found that the
higher the values of the parameters used by dejavu’s detec-
tion methods, the higher the detection accuracies they score,
which is the concern of RQ1. For example, the quick matching
detection method is guaranteed to yield the highest detection
accuracies with values of (tmatch = 1.0).
We argue that the higher the values of such parameters,
the harsher the criteria the detection method applies to match
a test app (α∗) to one app or a class of reference apps (α),
and the more accurate the classification decision gets. For
instance, a value of (tclassi f ication = 1.0) would instruct the
probabilistic classification detection method to return a label
(i.e., malicious or benign), only if its classifier is 100% con-
fident in its decision, as opposed to 80% or 70% confidence
for values of 0.8 or 0.7, respectively.
In table 1, we showed that time significantly alters the com-
position of different datasets. We expected such effect to be
a reflection of the maturity of the scan results returned by
VirusTotal [18]. That is, the older an Android app is, the
more analysis it will be subject to, and the more accurate its
labels will be. This should, in theory, help detection meth-
ods achieve better detection accuracies using labels drawn
from more recent VirusTotal scans. Regarding (RQ2), the
results of our experiments partly support this hypothesis. We
found that, by and large, dejavu’s detection methods perform
better with time on malicious datasets (i.e., Piggybacked and
Malgenome), especially quick matching and the ensemble.
As for RQ3, similar to the time dimension, varying the
labeling scheme (σlabel) had a noticeable effect on the detec-
tion accuracies of different detection methods. In this case,
however, we could not identify patterns that explain the per-
formances of all methods. Nonetheless, we demonstrate that
by altering the labeling scheme, a given detection method
can achieve on the exact same set of apps different detection
accuracies with differences up to 0.32 in some cases. For ex-
ample, as per table 3, the dejavu ensemble detection method
achieved on the Original dataset a detection accuracy of 0.99
under the original labeling scheme, 0.94 under vt1-vt1, and
0.75 under vt50p-vt1. So, using the same detection method
and the same dataset of apps, researchers adopting a con-
servative labeling scheme of vt1-vt1 (i.e., an app is deemed
malicious if only one VirusTotal scanner deems it so), those
adopting a relaxed scheme of vt50p-vt50p, and those relying
on the original labeling scheme adopted by the dataset authors
will have very different experiences. We believe that such dis-
crepancies stem from the way each detection method uses the
reference dataset, whose composition is profoundly affected
by varying the labeling scheme (i.e., as seen in table 1). The
aforementioned discrepancies, once again, emboss the effect
of adopting different, labeling schemes on the performance
of the same detection method on the same dataset.
In answering RQ4, we found that certain detection meth-
ods outperform the others under different attack scenarios
(i.e., as discussed in section 2.2). Using the results tabulated
in table 3, we found that quick matching performs better in
most cases under the confusion scenario. By definition, the
confusion scenario occurs whenever a repackaged app is be-
ing uploaded to a marketplace on which the original, benign
app resides, in an attempt to confuse any vetting mechanism
about the repackaged app’s true intentions. So, based on this
assumption, quick matching attempts to match test apps (α∗)
to one, or more, of the benign apps in dejavu’s reference
dataset (α). Since the test app (α∗) is designed to be similar
to its benign counterpart (α), quick matching can effectively
match apps and, using the techniques of codebase similarity
and compiler fingerprinting, decide upon whether (α∗) is a
malicious version of (α).
As for the probabilistic classification method, we found
that it performs poorly under the confusion scenario. Nonethe-
less, we found that the method scores higher detection accura-
cies than the other detection methods under the conventional
scenario, under which the test app (α∗) acts as an out-of-
sample app that has never been seen before by a marketplace’s
app vetting mechanism. Lastly, we found that the deep match-
ing detection method can be useful only upon being utilized
as a complementary method (e.g., within the dejavu ensem-
ble). Despite scoring high detection accuracies (as seen in
table 2), the method manages to analyze a small percentage of
the datasets ranging from 1% to 7% when used individually.
Within the malware analysis and detection domain, com-
bining detection methods is usually expected to yield better
results [13,28,34]. Consequently, we combined the individual
detection methods of quick matching, probabilistic classifi-
cation, and deep matching as an ensemble, called dejavu,
and recorded its detection accuracies on different datasets
and labeling schemes. To answer RQ5, we found that the
ensemble method does not consistently out or underperform
individual detection methods when considering accuracy as
the performance metric. However, considering the larger num-
ber of apps it classifies, dejavu’s ensemble method can be
considered to provide more comprehensive results.
Lastly, we postulated RQ6 in an attempt to understand the
nature of apps in the AMD and Piggybacking datasets that
do not fit either criteria of the vt50p-vt1 labeling scheme. In
other words, according to VirusTotal scan results, what are
the apps that were deemed malicious by at least one scanner,
yet were deemed malicious by less than 50% of such scanners.
For convenience, we refer to those apps as the gap apps. Our
hypothesis was that such gap apps are so-called potentially
unwanted software or grayware (e.g., Adware). Given that
VirusTotal scanners seldom agree upon a common label, we
used the data provided by Hurier et al. via their tool Euphony
[12] to get a consensus label for each gap app. Unfortunately,
the data provided by Euphony does not include consensus
labels for all the identified gap apps.
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Table 4: The number, percentage, and family distribution of
apps in the Piggybacking and AMD datasets that fit neither
criteria of the vt50p-vt1 labeling scheme.
Dataset Gap Apps Euphony Top Families
Piggybacking 1602 (58%) 906
Adware (68.87%)
Trojan (23.50%)
Spyware (2.98%)
AMD 11788 (48%) 9250
Adware (95.36%)
Trojan (1.94%)
Monitor (1.94%)
As seen in table 4, applying the vt50p-vt1 labeling scheme
reveals that about 58% of the apps in the Piggybacking dataset
and about half of the apps in the AMD dataset belong to this set
of ambiguous apps. Using Euphony, we managed to unify the
labels of 906 and 9250 gap apps in the Piggybacking and AMD
datasets, respectively. The results in the Top Families column
reveal that the majority of such ambiguous gap apps is Adware.
We postulate another research question: given the uncertainty
of its nature, why is Adware considered malicious?
Firstly, we argue that the malignancy of Adware is a matter
of perspective. On the one hand, as long as the Adware pay-
load does not disrupt the functionality of the app itself or over-
whelm them with advertisements, users might not consider
this breed of apps as malicious. On the other hand, developers
that rely on revenues from advertisements embedded in their
apps, yet have their apps repackaged to re-route such revenues
to attackers will consider Adware as malicious.
Secondly, the payloads of Adware are usually not malicious.
That is they do not usually jeopardize the device’s stability
or leak any sensitive user information. Instead, they establish
contact with remote URL’s to display advertisements or down-
load extra content. To decide upon whether such URL’s are
malicious, we extracted the URL’s contacted by the gap apps
in the AMD and Piggybacking datasets and used VirusTotal
scans results of such URL’s. Out of 553 URL’s extracted
from Piggybacking’s gap apps, only 98 (17.72%) were la-
beled as malicious by at least one VirusTotal scanner, with
an average of 1.70 scanners out of 66.66 deeming the URL’s
malicious. The results for the AMD’s gap apps were similar,
viz. 1709 (≈14%) out of 12282 URL’s were found malicious
with an average of 1.27 positive scanners out of 66.61.
We manually inspected a random sample of the URL’s la-
beled as malicious in both datasets and found that the majority
of such URL’s pointed to advertisement engines and servers
(e.g., https://api.airpush.com). Interestingly, some of
the more suspicious URL’s (e.g., http://221.11.29.181
or http://f5mv9t9x9wtx.pflexads.com), were either la-
beled as benign or were not even scanned by any of the
VirusTotal scanners.
6 Threats to Validity
We have identified four aspects that threaten the validity of
our findings, which we discuss in the following paragraphs.
As a use case, we focus on Android repackaged malware
due to the threat it poses to the Android ecosystem. Further-
more, given that Android repackaged malware can be encoun-
tered under different circumstances (as discussed in section
2.2), focusing on this breed of malware allows us to incor-
porate the dimension of attack scenario in our experiments.
However, we argue that our evaluation framework is applica-
ble to other types of Android malware and to other platforms
(e.g., Windows-based malware), which we plan to investigate
in future work.
Secondly, the sizes of the datasets we used in our evaluation
(i.e., Piggybacked, Original, and Malgenome), are relatively
small. Those sizes further decrease upon focusing on the apps
that were classified by a detection method under all different
labeling schemes (i.e., table 3). However, these are state-of-
the-art datasets for the use case we have in this paper, and we
consider it out of scope to increase the sizes of these datasets.
Other use cases (e.g., Windows-based malware) may have
larger datasets. Nevertheless, this is an important aspect to
consider when using our evaluation methodology.
Thirdly, the detection methods and techniques utilized by
dejavu depict only a subset of all the methods devised to de-
tect Android (repackaged) malware. For instance, we did not
consider dynamic-based methods that consider the runtime
behaviors of test apps. Moreover, we only used one classifier
(i.e., naive Bayes), instead of an ensemble of classifiers, for ex-
ample. However, the objective of this paper is neither to com-
pare all possible detection methods for Android (repackaged)
malware nor to promote dejavu as a particularly promising
detection method. The core contribution of our work is to
indicate that–regardless of the type, quality, or sophistication
of the utilized detection method–varying the freshness of
VirusTotal’s scan results, the scheme adopted to interpret
them to label apps, and the dataset used to emulate a particular
attack scenario significantly impacts the detection accuracy a
detection method.
Lastly, the 3 dimensions in our evaluation methodology are
not to be considered an exhaustive list. We plan to research
other aspects that might affect the performance of malware
detection methods and incorporate them in our framework.
7 Related Work
In this section, we enumerate the research efforts we found
are most relevant to ours.
(Android) Malware Labeling There is a number of efforts
that discuss the challenges facing the (Android) malware
detection community due to the inconsistencies of labeling
schemes and the volatility of data acquired from antiviral
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software/platforms. For example, in [11], Hurier et al. discuss
the difficulty of acquiring a consensus vis-à-vis the label of
a malicious Android app across different antiviral scanners.
Similarly, Sebastian et al. in [25] introduce a cross-platform
approach to rank (Android) malware labels and remove any
noisy or redundant aliases associated with a malware instance.
A closer work to ours, despite not focusing on Android mal-
ware, is that of Mohaisen et al. in [18]. In this work, the labels
returned by different antiviral scanners are assessed to un-
veil the danger of relying on incomplete, inconsistent, and
incorrect malware labels.
We have noticed that different researchers are aware of the
problems of using (a) inconsistent and outdated information
acquired from platforms such as VirusTotal, and (b) the
presence of different interpretations of such information to
label Android apps [12, 14, 33, 36]. Nonetheless, none of the
aforementioned studies, and, to the best of our knowledge,
no studies investigate the impact of using outdated labels or
different labeling schemes on the performance of a detection
method even on the same dataset.
Attack Scenarios In our experiments, we considered two
scenarios under which Android repackaged malware can be
encountered by detection or app vetting mechanisms, namely,
conventional scenario and confusion scenario. In the latter
scenario, we assumed that attackers may elect to target mar-
ketplaces on which the original, benign versions of their mali-
cious, repackaged instances reside to confuse any app vetting
mechanisms using such benign apps as references of benign
behaviors [5, 8, 10, 38]. Numerous efforts focus on devising
and demonstrating methods to repackage Android apps in a
manner that evades detection by any detection methods. By
and large, such efforts focus on evading detection by machine
learning classifiers and, thus, assumes that attackers possess
substantial knowledge about (a) the structure of the classifier
they are up against (e.g., the model it uses, its parameters, and
the features used to train it), and (b) the field of adversarial
machine learning.
In section 2.2, we defined a more realistic attacker that does
not possess that much information about the detection meth-
ods they are trying to evade. Consequently, the closest work
to ours was that of Salem et al. in [22]. In their work, they
demonstrated the effect of the confusion scenario on the per-
formance of an ensemble of machine learning classifiers that
otherwise perform well (i.e., under the conventional scenario).
They demonstrated that by testing an ensemble of classifiers
that have been trained using apps from the Original segment
of the Piggybacking dataset using apps from the Piggybacked
segment. Despite solely using the original labeling scheme
of the dataset, their experiments show the impact of the con-
fusion scenario, which inspired us to evaluate dejavu under
similar circumstances.
8 Conclusion
In evaluating (Android) malware detection methods, re-
searchers usually rely on (outdated) scan results obtained
from VirusTotal to label the apps in their training and test
datasets [15, 36, 41]. Unfortunately, due to the lack of con-
crete standards or common practices that guide this labeling
process, researchers rely on their subjective intuition to label
apps. Using outdated labeling information and adopting dif-
ferent schemes to label apps, we argue, significantly affects
the compositions of the datasets utilized by a malware detec-
tion method during evaluation, which leads to very different
outcomes. Unfortunately, this phenomenon renders the effec-
tiveness of a detection method as a matter of perspective. That
is, depending on which side of this labeling kaleidoscope we
are standing, the performance of a given detection method
even on the same dataset might differ.
To demonstrate volatility of the data acquired from
VirusTotal and the effect of interpreting it differently on
the performance of Android repackaged malware detection
methods, we implemented a representative ensemble of three
detection methods, called dejavu, and used it to conduct more
than 130 experiments using four different labeling schemes
and three different datasets containing over 30,000 Android
apps. The results obtained from our experiments indeed show
that the detection accuracy achieved by one detection method
might significantly vary depending on the freshness of the
labels (e.g., acquired from VirusTotal), the labeling scheme,
and the attack scenario, with differences up to 47% (i.e., from
0.68 to 1.0).
With our results and insights, we aspire to instigate the
adoption of a methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of
malware detection methods, that takes into consideration the
freshness of labels, the different labeling schemes that can
be adopted to label apps, and the different scenarios under
which malware can be found, if applicable. In other words,
we encourage researchers to adopt the following practices
in evaluating the detection methods they devise. Firstly, mal-
ware analysis and detection researchers need to take the time
dimension and the evolution of VirusTotal scan results into
consideration upon labeling their apps and re-analyze those
apps or acquire the latest scan results prior to evaluating
their methods. Secondly, to accommodate different labeling
schemes and ensure the comprehensiveness of their methods,
researchers are encouraged to document the effect of adopting
different labeling schemes on the performance of their meth-
ods. Needless to say, the more consistent the performance
of a method across different labeling schemes, the steadier
and more reliable it is. Lastly, researchers are encouraged to
utilize different datasets of apps and scenarios (as seen in sec-
tion 2.2), to ensure that their detection methods are resilient
under different circumstances. With that in mind, our primary
focus for future work is to devise a measure that gives an
overall assessment of the effectiveness of a detection method
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given its performance across different combinations of the
dimensions of time, labeling scheme, and attack scenario.
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Appendices
A Static Features
As discussed in section 3.2, we trained our probabilistic
classifiers using numerical features statically extracted from
the APK archives of apps in the Piggybacking (i.e, Piggy-
backed+Original), AMD, Malgenome, and GPlay datasets. In
total, each app was represented by a vector of 40 features,
which are divided into four categories, namely, basic features,
permission-based features, API call features, and miscella-
neous features. The following list mimics the order of every
feature in the feature vector.
Basic features:
1. Minimum SDK version (supported by the app).
2. Maximum SDK version (supported by the app).
3. Total number of activities.
4. Total number of services.
5. Total number of broadcast receivers.
6. Total number of content providers.
Permission-based features:
7. Total request permissions.
8. Ratio of Android permissions to total permissions.
9. Ratio of Custom permissions to total permissions.
10. Ratio of dangerous permissions to total permis-
sions.
API call features:
11. Total number of classes.
12. Total number of methods.
13. Count of calls to methods in the
android.accounts.AccountManager pack-
age.
14. Count . . . android.app.Activity package.
15. Count . . . android.app.DownloadManager pack-
age.
16. Count . . . android.app.IntentService pack-
age.
17. Count . . . android.content.ContentResolver
package.
18. Count . . . android.content.ContextWrapper
package.
19. Count . . . android.content.pm.PackageInstaller
package.
20. Count . . . android.database.sqlite.
SQLiteDatabase package.
21. Count . . . android.hardware.Camera package.
22. Count . . . android.hardware.display.
DisplayManager package.
23. Count . . . android.location.Location pack-
age.
24. Count . . . android.media.AudioRecord pack-
age.
25. Count . . . android.media.MediaRecorder pack-
age.
26. Count . . . android.net.Network package.
27. Count . . . android.net.NetworkInfo package.
28. Count . . . android.net.wifi.WifiInfo pack-
age.
29. Count . . . android.net.wifi.WifiManager
package.
30. Count . . . android.os.PowerManager package.
31. Count . . . android.os.Process package.
32. Count . . . android.telephony.SmsManager
package.
33. Count . . . android.widget.Toast package.
34. Count . . . dalvik.system.DexClassLoader
package.
35. Count . . . dalvik.system.PathClassLoader
package.
36. Count . . . java.lang.class package.
37. Count . . . java.lang.reflect.Method package.
38. Count . . . java.net.HttpCookie package.
39. Count . . . java.net.URL.openConnection pack-
age.
Miscellaneous features:
40. Zero-based index of the compiler used to compile
the app from (dx, dexmerge, dexlib 1.x, dexlib
2.x, Jack 4.x, or unknown).
B Additional Figures
B.1 dejavu Ensemble Accuracies and Parameters
To address research question (RQ1), we conducted a series of
experiments to investigate any relationship between different
labelings scheme and the parameters adopted by dejavu’s
individual detection methods (i.e., (tmatch), (tclassi f ication), and
(dmatch)), and whether this relationship affects the detection ac-
curacies scored by each method on the Piggybacked, Original,
and Malgenome datasets. In figure 2, we plot this relationship
and use it to extract the parameter values that helped each
detection method achieve the highest detection accuracy on
each dataset-labeling scheme combination. Furthermore, we
tabulate such values in table 5.
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Table 5: A summary of the values of (tmatch), (tclassi f ication), and (dmatch) that respectively helped the quick matching, probabilistic
classification, and deep matching detection methods yield the highest accuracies on different datasets and labeling schemes.
Detection Methods Quick Matching
(tmatch)
Probabilistic Classification
(tclassi f ication)
Deep Matching
(dmatch)
Labeling Scheme (σlabel) vt1-vt1 vt50p-vt50p vt50p-vt1 vt1-vt1 vt50p-vt50p vt50p-vt1 vt1-vt1 vt50p-vt50p vt50p-vt1
Piggybacked
(confusion/malicious)
≥ 0.8 ≥ 0.9 ≥ 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 3 2 2
Original
(reference/benign)
≥ 0.7 1.0 ≥ 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 2 2 3
Malgenome
(conventional/malicious)
≥ 0.7 ≥ 0.7 ≥ 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 2 2 2
Table 6: This table shows the contribution of each individual method (e.g., quick matching), to the overall detection accuracy of
dejavu’s ensemble. That is, how many of the correctly classified apps in each dataset-labeling scheme combination is attributed
to each detection method, and how long (on average) did it take each method to correctly classify an app.
Detection Methods Quick Matching
(seconds)
Probabilistic Classification
(seconds)
Deep Matching
(seconds)
Labeling Scheme (σlabel) vt1-vt1 vt50p-vt50p vt50p-vt1 vt1-vt1 vt50p-vt50p vt50p-vt1 vt1-vt1 vt50p-vt50p vt50p-vt1
Piggybacked
(confusion/malicious)
63%
(19.89)
96%
(8.81)
81%
(7.28)
37%
(15.36)
3%
(8.99)
18%
(5.82)
0.1%
(317.2)
0.1%
(64.8)
0.3%
(194.0)
Original
(reference/benign)
75%
(5.78)
42%
(5.22)
98%
(16.4)
24%
(7.53)
52%
(12.18)
1%
(75.61)
0.7%
(125.5)
5%
(100.2)
0.2%
(160.7)
Malgenome
(conventional/malicious)
2%
(2.66)
4%
(3.14)
2%
(3.1)
97%
(1.49)
95%
(2.87)
98%
(1.93)
0.6%
(89.4)
0.5%
(83.7)
0%
(0.0)
B.2 dejavu Detection Method Decomposition
In this section, we plot the contribution of each individual
detection method to the detection accuracies of dejavu’s en-
semble. Table 6 summarizes such contributions in terms of
the percentage of apps each detection method correctly clas-
sified as part of the ensemble for different dataset-labeling
scheme combinations. For example, under the original label-
ing scheme, 72% of the apps correctly classified by dejavu’s
ensemble were, in fact, classified by the quick matching de-
tection method with an average of 28.48 seconds taken to
classify those apps. We present this data in the form of pie
charts in figure 3.
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